From Moral Intuitions to Free Will Intuitions: A Dual Interacting-Process Model
Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy, cilt.9, sa.4, ss.881-897, 2019 (Hakemli Dergi)
- Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
- Cilt numarası: 9 Sayı: 4
- Basım Tarihi: 2019
- Doi Numarası: 10.18491/beytulhikme.1515
- Dergi Adı: Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy
- Sayfa Sayıları: ss.881-897
- Bilecik Şeyh Edebali Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet
Özet
In this essay, after first briefly reviewing the literature on experimentalphilosophy and how and why it is important especially for contemporaryanalytic philosophy, we focus on two earliest experimental research paperson free will intuitions. We also present psychological mechanisms that try toexplain why both philosophers and ordinary people have incompatibilist andcompatibilist intuitions and free will and moral responsibility. We then moveon to another experimental research on moral intuitions and develop a dualprocess model based on the model to explain moral intuitions. However, ourdual interacting-process model is not intended for moral intuitions but free willintuitions. Finally, we critically examine other mechanisms and briefly defendour model.